The Yom Kippur War: 1973

Israeli troops rotated in and out of the defensive positions on their new borders of the Sinai and the Golan heights for six years prior to October of 1973. On Saturday, October 6, 1973, Yom Kippur, Syrian and Egyptian forces launched massive offensives to regain territory they had lost in the Six Day War. The Golan Heights, now Israel’s Northeastern border, overlooked much of the Israeli heartland, and their possession was seen as a key part of Israel’s security.
          
Israeli M48's knocked out in the Sinai
Public Domain via USN
  Syrian air attacks and artillery barrages were aimed at hitting the Israeli defenses. The Syrians in fat had more artillery pieces in action than the Israeli’s had manning their frontier bunkers on the Golan.[1] The long barrage did little to truly disrupt the IDF’s defenses, but the lack of air support for the IDF, and the massive Syrian numbers were soon to cause trouble. The IDF’s Centurion and up gunned Sherman tanks would be facing waves of Russian built Syrian T-55s and T-62s, their superior gunnery training negated by the dust clouds that the oncoming columns and the artillery barrages were creating, preventing the Israeli’s from engaging at maximum range.[2]
            Artillery fire and the minefields laid by the IDF did slow the Syrian onslaught, but the weight of numbers, often at a ten to one advantage, simply overwhelmed the Israeli Centurions. Still, the Israelis were causing massive casualties, especially when two IDF Centurions flanked an oncoming Syrian detachment of tanks. The small number of IDF Centurions struggled to contain each puncture to their lines. Here, the technical superiority of the Centurion came into play. Each tank could carry over twenty more rounds than the Syrian T-55’s and T-62’s.[3]
Syrian T-55 Knocked out at an IDF defensive
position.
Public Domain via IDF
Also, the Centurion’s main gun tended to be more accurate at a longer distance. Although taller, given the defensive nature of the IDF’s fight, the Centurion also possessed the advantage of greater gun depression over the Russian vehicles. At the Southern end of the Golan, the Israelis, at the end of the first day had claimed sixty Syrian tanks, but had lost most of their own force, including key officers.[4]
            Syrian numbers and improved weaponry was still having a noticeable effect. The Syrians, through tank fire and infantry weapons, had eliminated the Israeli tanks in the Tel Saki area. Israeli troops were forced to fall back towards the center of the Golan. Confusion in the Israeli high command under Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, caught off guard by the attack, only hampered the IDF’s response with reinforcements.[5] It was left to junior commanders to take advantage of Syrian timidity, as the Syrians, having suffered heavy losses, were now having to conduct reconnaissance in force.
            The Syrian’s although equipped in many cases with the new T-62, were finding that despite its outgrowth from the T-55, it was a different vehicle that did not handle as well over the rough terrain, slowing their advance.[6] Around Naffach, however, the IDF and the Syrians exchanged body blows, inflicting severe casualties on each other in what was becoming a serious tank brawl, with infantry on both sides knocking out tanks with anti-tank weapons, outlining how far shaped charge munitions were now affecting armored warfare. It was only when down to a few surviving Centurions that the IDF successfully drove back the Syrians at nightfall on the 7th.[7]
            Having contained and blocked the furthest Syrian thrusts, the IDF counterattacked, trading tanks with the Syrians over the successive days. The deciding factor’s in the Israeli’s favor was their utter tenacity and their training. In many cases, they were able to get the first shot off. However, at Tel Saki, combined arms tactics were required to overcome the Syrian resistance. As the Syrians fell back into the Hushniya Pocket, the Israelis prepared to encircle and sweep through the defensive position. However, the Syrians offered heavy resistance until they finally withdrew.[8]
            By the time the Syrians withdrew in full, almost 900 tanks had been knocked out or
IDF Centurion on the Golan
Public domain via CIA
abandoned. Hundreds upon hundreds of vehicles. On October 23, 1973, the Syrian government accepted the terms of a U.N. ceasefire and the Israeli forces withdrew from Syria. The IDF had lost over 250 tanks in the Golan. The Israelis had been able to hold their own, despite nearly overwhelming numbers due to their own training and tenacity. The overall superiority of the British and American tanks was given a greater edge by the superior training and positioning of the IDF tanks.




[1] Jerry Ashur with Eric Hammel, Duel for the Golan: the 100 Hour Battle that Saved Israel, (New York: William Morrow, 1987), 84.
[2] Ashur with Hammel, Duel for the Golan, 88.
[3] Ibid., 95.
[4] Ibid., 107.
[5] Ibid., 157.
[6] Ibid., 163.
[7] Ibid., 174.
[8] Ibid., 254.

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