The Six Day War: 1967

By 1967, Israel had become a point of contention in the Middle East. The Jewish state had to fight for its existence against Egypt and Jordan upon its creation in 1948 from British Trans-Jordan. The original mandate had been deemed to indefensible, and, in the course of the fighting in 1948, the Israelis succeeded in expanding their borders. Guerrilla attacks Arab Palestinians, supported by Gamal Nasser, the Egyptian premier, were met with Israeli reprisals on the West Bank of the Jordan.[1]
Sherman Tanks on the Golan, 1967
National Photo Collection of Israel,
Photography dept. Goverment Press Office
,
 under the digital ID 
D327-098.
By 1955, Nasser was aligning himself with the Soviet block and acquiring tanks and small arms through Czechoslovakia. The 1956 conflict over the Suez Canal with France, Britain, and Israel versus Egypt. At the end of the conflict, even though Britain and France had withdrawn under international pressure, Israel was able to exchange their hold on the Sinai for guarantees for the straights of Tiran. The Israeli Defense Forces, or IDF, had demonstrated that it was a well-trained and competent fighting force both in the air and on the ground. During the 1950s and early 1960s, Israel was able to acquire massive amounts of military equipment from France, Great Britain, and the United States.
            As Nasser built up his alliances with Syria and Jordan, the IDF was prepared to make a bold first strike upon the Arab states if the need arose. Possessing over 1000 modern tanks, the IDF’s strategy was primarily aimed at destroying Egypt’s military capacity before Israel’s cities could be directly harmed.[2] By 1965, tensions were escalating, as Israel skirmished with its neighbors from the Golan to the West Bank. By May of 1967, Israel began to interpret the growing Egyptian buildup in the Sinai as preparations for an invasion, and began call up reservists to active duty.[3]
            On June 5, 1967, under the cover of massive air attacks, IDF tanks and infantry infiltrated Egyptian positions in the Sinai. At Khan Unis, IDF tankers fought with a mixture of British built Centurion and American Patton main battle tanks, facing off against Egyptian T-34s, which although not as modern, gave a good account of themselves.[4] Elsewhere in the Sinai, Egyptian battalions were equipped with antiquated but still impressive Russian “Stalin” heavy tanks, while IDF tankers in some cases were still equipped with older WWII surplus Sherman tanks, but Israeli successes were attributed to Egyptian confusion and superior planning. At al-Arish, Egyptian mistook the oncoming IDF columns for their own, and the Israeli tanks were among them before they could beat off their attack. However, after a fierce point blank tank battle, the IDF’s 79th Tank battalion had suffered the loss of twenty-eight of its tanks or vehicles.[5] By the end of the first day, the Israeli forces had thrown the Egyptians into confusion and would continue to push them back, even as Israeli troops were committed to battles near the Golan and in the West Bank.
           
Via Wikipedia and Bukvoed
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:AMX-13-latrun-2.jpg
Once the mobile Israeli columns disrupted the Egyptian defenses, it became difficult for them to become reestablished. Egyptian counterattacks kept getting impaled upon the guns of the IDF Centurions. Even when committed against more modern Soviet built T-55’s, the Israelis showed surprising adeptidute in tank warfare, such as at Bir Gfgafa, where ten were knocked out by IDF. By the end of the conflict, the IDF had destroyed over 300 tanks and 10,000 other vehicles, and possessed the bulk of the Sinai peninsula.[6] In the end, the Israeli’s despite being outnumbered, were better trained. One assessment by the British ambassador to Israel, Michael Hadow, stated that, “the professional Arab armies showed a total lack of appreciation of the essential elements of modern warfare, and an almost equal inability to use the sophisticated weapons and equipment provided by their Russian quartermasters.”[7] Israeli training won them a stunning victory, but the Arab nations, particularly Syria, would take note of Israeli prowess at the Golan heights six years later.




[1] Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, (New York: Oxford, 2002), 9.
[2] Oren, Six Days of War, 17.
[3] Ibid., 63.
[4] Ibid., 179.
[5] Ibid., 181.
[6] Ibid., 305.
[7] Ibid., 311.

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